Western Michigan University

ScholarWorks at WMU
Master's Theses

Graduate College

12-2008

Breaking Protocol: The Failure of the Bush Administration to
Ratify the Kyoto Protocol as A State Crime
Jacquelynn A. Doyon

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses
Part of the Sociology Commons

Recommended Citation
Doyon, Jacquelynn A., "Breaking Protocol: The Failure of the Bush Administration to Ratify the Kyoto
Protocol as A State Crime" (2008). Master's Theses. 3859.
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/3859

This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for
free and open access by the Graduate College at
ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please
contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

BREAKING PROTOCOL: THE FAILURE OF THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION TO RATIFY THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL AS A STATE CRIME

by
Jacquelynn A. Doyon

A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
Department of Sociology

Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
December 2008

Copyright by
Jacquelynn A. Doyon
2008

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
For my parents. All four of them.

No words can express my gratitude for their unending support and
encouragement in all that I do. I would not be where I am today without
them, and no matter where I go, I carry them with me.
Jacquelynn A. Doyon

11

BREAKING PROTOCOL: THE FAILURE OF THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION TO RATIFY THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL AS A STATE CRIME
Jacquelynn A. Doyon, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 2008
Using the Kyoto Protocol as a centrifugal focus point, this research
conceptualizes the failure of the United States to act on global warming as a
state crime. The decision of the United States not to ratify the protocol was
largely based on economic justifications. However, the actions taken
following the Kyoto Protocol indicate that the US government was instead
dedicated more to their own economical interests, rather than those of the
state as a whole. Through the exploration of possible economic and political
motivations, the research identifies ulterior motives of the Bush
administration that have proved to be detrimental to the environment.
Through the application of a theoretical model of state crime developed by
Michalowski and Kramer (2006), the opportunity and motivation for a state
crime emerges and is identified.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In December of 1997, the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) held an international conference in Kyoto, Japan.
The purpose of this conference was to develop a new treaty, or "protocol"
that would be an international agreement to begin worldwide reductions of
carbon emissions. It was here that the well known "Kyoto Protocol" came
into being. As the top emitter of carbon emissions, the United States was on
board with the Kyoto Protocol, as it was supported by the Clinton
administration and signed by President Bill Clinton in 1998 (Sands 2003). The
protocol, however, needed not signatory power but the ratification of at least
55 nations to enter into effect. Even though President Clinton had signed the
protocol, this indicated only agreement with the document and the intention
to ratify-the document was not a valid contract until the United States
(along with 54 other nations) had ratified it. When the time came for
ratification, new presidential elect George W. Bush shocked the world by not
only failing to pass the document along for ratification by the Senate, but he

2
even "unsigned" the document itself by declaring the retraction of the United
States from the document (Sands 2005). Needless to say, this was a very bold
and unanticipated act given the fact that much effort had been made to alter
the protocol to meet the demands of the United States. It was chiefly
unexpected given that that Bush's campaign for presidency was largely on
board with progressive environmental policies. Frankly stated, the current
Bush administration put to a halt what the previous administration had
attempted to mobilize.
The impending threat of global warming (also known as climate
change) has been an environmental concern for the past five decades.
National governments, including the United States, have been aware of the
problem for this span of time at a minimum. While other nations have banded
together to stop-and hopefully even reverse-the effects of global warming,
the United States has not taken any decisive action. The failure of the United
States government to deal with or act in regard to climate change (as to be
demonstrated by the research) has been largely politically and economically
driven, and may end up costing humanity greatly. Through the
conceptualization of the failure to act on global warming/climate change as a
state crime of omission, this paper will analyze the failure of the United States
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to take action in the fight against global warming through the decision not to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
State crime is not a recent phenomenon. It has existed as long as states
themselves have been in existence, and no state is exempt from crime. It is,
however, within this century that we have begun to identify and
acknowledge these crimes. For the purpose of the research, state crime is
defined as "harmful activities carried out by the state on behalf of some state
agency" (Freidrichs 1996: 122). The "harmful activities" reviewed here are
those pertaining to environmental protection and regulation and will be
elaborated on throughout. The "state agency" will be identified using the
integrated theoretical model of state crime developed by Raymond
Michalowski and Ron Kramer (Michalowski and Kramer 2006). The model
identifies three levels of state crime along with motivations that help to
encourage and catalyze the actions. More specifically, this research examines
the influence of the Bush administration on three separate levels of analysis
(structural, organizational and interactional).
At this critical point in history, is it crucial to take notice and act upon
the events that are occurring around the globe. Climate change is one of the
most imperative issues facing the world; other nations have taken action on
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this problem, but the United States has done very little. Accordingly, this
research will analyze the 'how' and the 'why' of this failure.
The purpose of this study is to investigate past actions taken (or not
taken) in relation to global warming surrounding the Kyoto Protocol. Such
actions include (but are not limited to): the failure to enforce (or even
establish) environmental regulations; the failure to act upon scientific
knowledge regarding global warming; and the attempt to withhold or alter
scientific documents regarding global warming from the public. By analyzing
legislative evidence from a wide variety of sources regarding the Bush
administration's actions concerning climate change, it is possible to uncover
knowledge of the issue not currently publicized by the media, leaving US
citizens uninformed. Such data can also help to reveal the extent to which the
United States government was aware of the impending threat of global
warming prior to recent events, like the Kyoto Protocol. These actions, which
culminate at the failure of the United States government to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol, will allow for insight to be made about prior awareness of global
warming. The significance of this lies not only in public ignorance about the
current administration (and the issue of global warming), but also in that the
US failed to act in spite of its knowledge on the issue. The data uncovered will
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more fully reveal how the Bush administration had knowledge about the
dangers of global warming but failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which is
argued here to be a state crime.
For several decades, the United States government has been aware of
the impending threat of global warming. This awareness has often led to
action wherein bills and laws were passed to help minimize the effects of
human pollution on the environment. Specific governmental organizations
(such as the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA]) were developed in an
effort to regulate and enforce the newly developed policies. On a global level,
the United States has participated in several international protocols aimed at
regulating pollutants on a broader scale. Traditionally, the US has been very
much in concert with other nations regarding such policies, often being the
strongest proponent to signing, passing and ratifying the various protocols.
In fact it was often stated that the United States should take a leadership role
in the fight against global warming (Kennedy Jr. 2004; Sands 2003; Sands
2005; and White 1996). It was only recently that the United States failed to
participate in the largest decision (culminating in the Kyoto Protocol) and
decided not to ratify the protocol. It was this act of omission that is pivotal to
this research, and will be explored in great detail.
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In order to advance that this act is a state crime of omission, a review
of past policies and protocols is in order. While prior efforts in the fight to
protect the environment are irrefutably valuable, the penultimate acts
surrounding the US and the Kyoto Protocol are the most surprising and
detrimental, not only in regard to the fight against climate change, but also in
regard to international relations regarding environmental policies. This act of
omission does not come unaccompanied; both economic and political
motivations lie beneath the surface. This research will thus address the
congruence of the vested interests of those (not) acting on behalf of the state.
By once again utilizing the theoretical framework developed by Michalowski
and Kramer (2006), state crime theory will be applied to explain the actions
and events surrounding the Kyoto protocol.
A brief historical background and abbreviated timeline of global
warming will be included as well as a review of the environmental policies
participated in by the United States. The literature research will also include
background information pertaining to past actions involving environmental
policies, especially those regarding the regulation of fossil fuels. This review
will be of particular interest in order to discern a pattern of US participation
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in pro-environmental acts. They will also help to show if and how the pattern
is broken by the failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
The specific actions of the Bush administration will be under particular
scrutiny. What might be the explanations for the decision regarding the
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol? And more importantly, what were the
underlying vested interests and possible motivations for these actions? The
preliminary exploration into this matter has revealed that there may ha've
been a concomitant attempt to conceal and diminish the severity of global
warming by the Bush administration. Did the administration deliberately
censor information that was to be revealed to the public regarding
environmental issues? The application of the theoretical model in concert
with the culminating failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (when the danger of
global warming had been demonstrated) can inductively be argued to be a
state crime of omission.
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CHAPTER II
ENVIRONMENTAL LITERATURE REVIEW
Environmental Overview
Early Signs of Global Warming
When discussing a controversial issue, it is important to clarify the
issue in question. Therefore the myths and truths of global warming must be
explored in order to prove a state crime regarding global warming. A
comprehensive explanation of what is known (and widely accepted by
scientists) of global warming is included for this purpose.
Global warming, essentially, is the observed increase in the earth's
temperature. Contributing factors to global warming include greenhouse
gases (i.e. water vapor, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide
(NOx), and ozone). As these gases are emitted into the atmosphere, they
create a layer that blocks the suns rays (and heat) from exiting the earth's
atmosphere, thus warming the earth (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Diagram of Global Warming
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Scientist Roger Revelle of Harvard University noted that following
WWII, economic expansion combined with a rapidly increasing population
(that relied almost completely on coal and oil) would likely produce an
excessive and potentially harmful increase in the amount of CO 2 in the
earth's atmosphere (Gore 2006). Revelle began to record the levels of CO 2 in
the atmosphere and soon confirmed his predictions. In 1979, Revelle testified
at a Senate hearing to the potential consequences of his findings. The Senate
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Committee not only did not act upon Revelle's testimony, but even seemed to
pass it off as inconsequential, according to observers (Gore 2006). Revelle was
not the first scientist to consider the effects of human influence on the
environment. As far back as 1870, scientists have commented on the potential
effects of carbon dioxide on the atmosphere (Read 1994). Within the past
twenty years, scientists have uncovered an astronomical amount of data
pertaining to global warming and climate change.
Recent Signs of Global Warming
By 1988, enough scientists had made sufficient amounts of noise across
the globe to lead to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
The panel was first developed by the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO) as well as the United Nations Environment Program (Global 2001).
The first IPCC report was published in 1990. In 1995, the IPCC published its
second report which staked several controversial claims. At this time, the
IPCC predicted that global warming would cause average temperatures to
increase by 1-3.5 degrees Celsius by the year 2100 (Global 2001). They also
predicted that sea-level would rise by 0.13 -0.94 meters (Global 2001). At this
time, the IPCC made the claim that "[t]he balance of evidence suggests a
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discernable human influence on global climate" (Global 2001: 203). The
evidence that the IPCC and other environmental organizations rely on comes
from several different measuring techniques. The three major methods of
measuring climate change are: increase in temperature (measured by simply
recording data all over the world); measuring the rise in both sea level and
temperature (once again, recorded daily all over the world); and measuring
levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) which are measured by retrieving
...Atlantic icecap ice-core samples ...taken of compressed snow that has
been piling up for 160,000 years, covering four ice ages and intervening
periods, of which the latest warm epoch has featured recorded history.
Contemporaneous temperatures can be measured by the proportion of
isotope deuterium (resulting in 'heavy water') in the ice and cross
checked by studies of the widths of annual tree rings in ancient logs
recovered from peat bogs etc. (Read 1994: 3 9).
These samples are then used for carbon dating, which can provide the levels
of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere in each earth year (Read 1 994).
In 2001, the IPCC released its third report. At this time, they projected
that the temperature would increase from 1.4 - 5.8 degrees Celsius (2.5 - 10.4
degrees F). They revised their statement to read: [t]here is new and stronger
evidence that most of the [atmospheric] warming observed over the last 50
years is attributable to human activities" (Global 2001: 204). The IPCC
asserted that even if greenhouse gases were to be stabilized today, there
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could potentially still be affects beyond the 21 st century. Possible explanations
for this would be the "weakening of ocean thermohaline circulation" (Global
2001: 204). Thermohaline circulation is imperative to global stability in that it
assists in the regulation of temperature in such regions as the arctic north and
Europe (Global 2001). Any disruption to the current of circulation could result
in less than temperate climates for these areas, and subsequently others.
Current Global Warming
The most recent report by the IPCC was released on February 5th, 2007.
This time, the report was much more extensive.
Long-term trends from 1900 to 2005 have been observed in
precipitation amounts over many large regions. Significantly increased
precipitation has been observed in eastern parts of North and South
America, northern Europe and northern and central Asia. Drying has
been observed in the Sahel, the Mediterranean, southern Africa and
part of southern Asia. Precipitation is highly variable spatially and
temporally, and data are limited in some regions (IPCC 2007: 8).
Widespread changes in extreme temperatures have been observed
over the last 50 years. Cold days, cold nights and frost have become
less frequent, while hot days, hot nights and heat waves have become
more frequent (IPCC 2007: 8).
At this point in time, it is predicted that roughly a 0.2 degrees Celsius is
expected for every decade if emissions continue at the current rate. Even if
these emissions were to be kept constant, it is projected that warming would
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continue at roughly 0.1 degree Celsius per decade (IPCC 2007). What is even
more alarming than the current increases are the predictions for the future. In
the past two decades, we have experienced a warming of 0.15 -0.30 degrees
Celsius per decade (IPCC 2007). The IPCC contends that
[c]ontinued greenhouse gas emissions at or above current rates would
cause further warming and induce many changes in the global climate
system during the 21st century that would very likely be larger than
those observed during the 20th century.
For a visual example, see Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Temperature and CO2 Levels to Present1
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Figure 2 represents the drastic increase in temperature and CO2 levels in
recent history. As demonstrated, we have reached record highs for CO2, and
have also experienced severely increased temperatures. Those who dispute
global warming argue that the warming of the earth is a natural cycle, and
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there is no need for concern (McRight and Dunlap 2003). While Figure 2
represents these earlier periods of warming, it also represents that the
temperature spiked and then rapidly decreased in those instances. In the most
recent period of warming, the temperature has remained consistently high,
and judging from data, will not decrease anytime soon (IPCC 2007).
Furthermore, we have not only experienced warming, but also the concurrent
melting of the polar ice caps. In past warming periods, the data demonstrate
that the warming period only affected selected areas, not the entire planet
(Read 1994).
The rising sea level is an additional concern associated with
global warming.
Anthropogenic warming and sea level rise would continue for
centuries due to the timescales associated with climate processes
and feedbacks, even if greenhouse gas concentrations were to be
stabilized (IPCC 2007: 17).
Figure 3 (see below) is very clear: sea levels have only increased since the 19 th
century. An increase in sea level is detrimental for a few reasons. The first,
and perhaps most obvious, is that as sea levels rise, more of the coastline will
subsequently be under water. Several have speculated that the coastlines of

1

Figure taken from the IPCC.
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New York, Florida, Japan and Europe will be underwater, displacing millions
of people (Gore 2006).
Figure 3: Recent Sea Level Rise2
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As for the current sea level, it is now projected to rise by 0.1 to 0.2 meters by
the year 2100 (IPCC 2007). There are predictions that the Arctic and Antarctic
ice will continue to decrease (melt) at alarming rates. It is very likely that the
recent 'heat-waves' will continue, and even become more frequent (IPCC
2007). And to what can all of these changes be attributed to?
Global atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and
nitrous oxide have increased markedly as a result of human activities
since 1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial values determined from
ice cores spanning many thousands of years. The global increases in

2

Figure taken from the IPCC.
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carbon dioxide concentration are due primarily to fossil fuel use3 • • •
(IPCC 2007: 2).
Figure 4: Carbon Dioxide Levels (ppm - parts per million4)
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In Figure 4, the drastic spike in CO2 levels is verified. This is potentially the
largest contributor to global warming and it is a direct result of human
activity (Read 1994). Clearly, there is a human element of causation when
contemplating the dramatic climate changes that are currently occurring. As
fossil fuels are pointedly the most violent offender of climate change, and the
United States is the largest consumer of these fuels (Gore 2006), it is important

3

4

Italics added.
Figure taken from the IPCC.
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to consider what the United States is doing to regulate or even reverse the
pollution of the atmosphere.
Human Contribution to Global Warming
While current changes in the environment can be attributed in part to
natural earth cycles, a majority of them cannot. The IPCC in its most recent
report stated that it was "very likely" that humans are the cause of global
warming (2007: 14). See Figure 5 for further demonstration.
Figure 5: Components of Global Environmental Change5
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5 Figure demonstrates the relationships among human population and activity, the
components of change, and changes in climate and biological diversity. The wide arrow's
represent the dominant effects (Vitousek 1994).
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As no science can ever be 100 percent certain, the phrase "very likely" is as
close as scientists can come to asserting certainty, which constitutes a 90
percent probability (Roach 2007). This is a marked increase from prior reports
in 2001, stating that humans were "likely" the cause·of global warming, which
is only equaled to 66 percent probability in the scientific field (Roach 2007). As
human contribution to global warming has been accepted by a majority of the
scientific community, these contributions themselves must also be reviewed.
The recent increases in global temperatures are most often attributed to
the use of fossil fuels, and the then resulting emissions of carbon dioxide into
the atmosphere. Large increases in CO 2 emissions came with the start of the
Industrial Age. New agricultural and industrial practices were developed
continuously, and all became mass producers of CO 2 (see Figure 5). Coupled
with the industrial and agricultural changes was population growth,
deforestation, factory farming and eventually the widespread use of fossil
fuels. Achim Steiner, the executive director of the United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP) stated that "[f]ossil fuel use, agriculture and
land-use change are fundamentally affecting the systems of our planet"
(Roach 2007). Obviously, anthropocentrism has been a major contributor to
environmental deterioration.
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CHAPTER III

METHODS

One objective of this research is to ascertain to what extent the US
government was aware of the potential harms surrounding global warming,
and to understand whether their actions (or lack thereof) in response to this
knowledge were appropriate. In order to ascertain this, data were collected
from several different sources, including environmental protocols stemming
from various conventions specifically concerning air pollution. Air pollution
protocols were specifically reviewed based on the factor that it s a major
cause of global warming. Participation in conventions and protocols are
largely voluntary; however, they have the potential to be more or less
beneficial to varying states.
A convention, simply put, is the gathering of various governments for
discussion on a specific topic that serves as a framework to address that topic,
sometimes highlighting goals and possible resolutions. For the purposes of
this research, only environmental conventions were focused upon. Protocols
are the agreements (or contracts) developed by those states at the different
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conventions. A protocol is also a form of treaty, and typically can
supplement, clarify, or amend an existing international agreement (Sands
2003). Depending upon the specific convention, there can be many, one, or no
protocols developed at all. The following conventions, and subsequent
protocols wer_e reviewed: The 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution (which yielded the 1985 Sulphur Protocol, the
1988 Nitrous Oxide Protocol, the 1998 Aarhus Protocol on Heavy Metals and
the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and
Ground-Level Ozone); the 1985 Vienna Convention (1987 Montreal Protocol);
and the 1992 Climate Change Convention (1997 Kyoto Protocol). These
specific protocols were selected because of their relevance to the topic. As
global warming is a direct result of atmospheric pollution, conventions and
protocols regarding atmospheric conditions over the last 30 years were
chosen for review. They were then used to cross-check US participation in
said protocols. The various protocols help to offer precedence to actions taken
by the United States government prior to the Kyoto Protocol, and illuminate
the need for governmental action.
Governmental documents, including Senate hearing documents from
the Committee on Environment and Public Works, and the Committee on
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Science, Engineering and Public Policy; press releases, letters of resignation,
and documents relating to US action surrounding the Kyoto Protocol, were
reviewed in order to asses governmental action, and potential political and
economic motivations. The Senate hearing documents were valuable in that
they demonstrated national action related to environmental issues, as
opposed to conventions and protocols (which demonstrate international
action). Through extensive research stemming essentially from a convenience
sample, these documents were selected through a paper-trail, as the
researcher simply selected a document relevant to the Kyoto Protocol, and
then followed the sources used and identified in those documents. For
example, the examination of a convention might identify a protocol
pertaining to air pollution; the subsequent examination of that document
would then illuminate US participation; that participation (or non
participation) would offer precedence to US environmental action, and
possibly even-identify key players. This process of successive document
review was sustained until the same or similar sources began to reappear
continuously, reaching saturation. For example, continued research regarding
the alteration of scientific documents repeatedly led back to the same
individuals (Philip Cooney, James Hansen and Rick Piltz). After continued
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searches turned up the same findings and led to the same outcomes, it was
decided that that area of research had been saturated.
As this is an international issue, intergovernmental documents, such as
reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), the United Nations
Environmental Program (UNEP) and the United Nations Framework
Committee on Climate Change (UNFCCC) were also considered. These were
retrieved through the same process aforementioned, and once again were
able to illuminate environmental action on the behalf of the US as well as
other nations. Because of the attention gathered by this issue in the news and
media sector, articles and reports from the BBC, The Washington Post, Time,
MSNBC, PBS Frontline News, the New York Times, CBS 60 Minutes and
National Geographic provided a well rounded look at circulating stories
regarding the issue, and helped the researcher to ascertain the information
that was reaching (or not reaching) the public. Once again, these documents
were selected in the paper-trail fashion previous stated.
Last, various research articles and texts pertaining to global warming
and state crime were also reviewed and incorporated, for even further
comprehensiveness of the data collection effort. The culmination of the
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collection of this data will summit with the failure of the United States to sign
on with world environmental activism epitomized in the ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol.
As global warming has been stated to be the greatest challenge facing
governments in this century (Sands 2005), it came as a great shock to the
international community when the United States did not jump on the
international bandwagon towards its control and prevention. President Bush
stated several reasons for not signing, some of which were related to fact that
it would greatly affect the national economy, namely increasing energy costs.
While economic concerns are certainly legitimate, Bush's economic concerns
seem to be linked to the oil industry. Indeed, research uncovered data
pertaining to this and will be discussed in the findings. These economic
motivations were specifically addressed through governmental documents,
press releases and cabinet appointments submitted by the Bush
administration6 •
On an international level, this decision severed many political ties on

All documents discussed up to this point (excluding protocols/conventions) were not
limited to a time-specific search. The researcher followed the data where it led, without
chronological constraint. Documents were reviewed until saturation of the data was reached.

6
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the part of the United States, therefore political motivations were also
considered. Obviously, there was something more important than
maintaining international political ties, which suggests intranational political
motivation. These motivations, by necessity, must also be explored. Once
again, governmental documents and press releases (coupled with documents
kept and/or altered from the press and public) were reviewed. All of the
governmental documents used were between 2001 and 2008, as so they were
current with the Bush administration. Both political and economic
motivations may help to explain the shift in actions of the United States in the
fight against global warming.
The research uncovered the actions taken by individuals in the Bush
administration in response to knowledge pertaining to global warming. It is
here that the political and economic motivations can be connected to the
actors, thus connecting the acts of omission7 that led to the failure to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol. This final act classifies as state crime of omission on many
levels, which will be explained through the application of a theoretical model
of state crime developed by Michalowski and Kramer (2006).

7 A crime of omission is defined by Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews (2003) as the failure to
act, thus allowing harmful activities to continue.

25

Organization of Data
In order to organize the data, a systematic approach utilizing note
cards was employed. There were three different colors of note cards used
initially (blue, pink and yellow) with the later addition of white note cards.
Blue note cards denote collected evidence regarding US governmental actions
and policies (such as participation or nonparticipation in protocols or
development of national environmental policies); pink notes cards were
specifically for intergovernmental environmental policies and protocols (such
as global participation in protocols, and importance of international policies
and protocols); yellow note cards were reserved for theoretical issues (which
were used to determine the culpability of a state crime); and white note cards
were added to incorporate scientific issues, as the category presented itself in
the middle of the research process. Data were easily categorized based on the
specificity of each category.
These issues were selected because of their direct relevance to the
topic. The documents selected were reviewed an average of three times each
in order to ensure proper categorizing, which was considered and
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reconsidered upon each review. If there was a discrepancy in the organization
of the data, it was reviewed yet again to secure proper placement. The cards
contain the source of the data, along with the year in which the data were
published in the left hand corner. The right hand corner is reserved for a
coding system, and the date of collection for the data. Through theoretical
analysis on both national and international levels, it is hoped that a more
direct interpretation of actions taken by the US government can be
developed. The methodological coding system is detailed below.
Methodological Coding System
EH = Environmental History (blue)
EP = Environmental Protocols prior to the Kyoto Protocol (pink)
KP = Information pertaining specifically to the Kyoto Protocol (pink)
EL = Environmental Law Issues (pink)
EM= Economic Issues/ Motivations (blue)
PM = Political Motivations (blue)
SI = Scientific Issues (white)
BA= Issues concerning the Bush administration (blue)
DA= Document Alteration of Governmental Documents (blue)
SC= State Crime Theory (yellow)
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The categories EH, EM, PM, BA and DA were all coded on blue cards because
of their relevance to US governmental policy and actions. Categories EP, KP,
and EL were coded on pink cards because of their international and
intergovernmental ties. State crime theory issues were coded yellow because
of their theoretical connection, and scientific issues were coded on white note
cards as because of their scientific relevance. Both the color and the coding
systems assist with the organization and placement of the data retrieved.
Topics were categorized based on the grouping with which they were most
relevant. In the situation that a topic was relevant to more than one category,
it was double-coded will all relevant categories, but placed with the one to
which it was most relevant. In the case that specific information fit into more
than once category (i.e. Environmental History and Environmental Protocols)
separate cards were made for each category. This occurred most often
between the BA and DA categories, as the actors identified in these categories·
were relevant to both categories. However, even in this instance, the methods
used here still allowed appropriate categorization of the data. Because of the
candid titles of the categories, their content is self explanatory.
The categorizing process was at first overwhelming, but with
continued work, it became almost mechanical. The EP, KP and EH categories
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are an excellent illustration of the coding system at work. These categories
were clear-cut and easily separated. For example, all environmental protocols
reviewed (EP category) were international agreements (thus placed on pink
cards) and could be listed and located easily in chronological order of
enactment, publication by the author, or the date in which the data were
recorded. This allowed for easy retrieval of the data when it came time for
writing. While not the most intricate of coding systems, the one applied here
was functional and efficient for this study.
During the course of this study, I was bombarded with new research
sent to me from colleagues as well online news and media sources. The sheer
volume of research pertaining to global warming itself and human
contribution to it was difficult to harness. This study, while complete for its
purpose, is far from exhaustive in its data. Because of continuous unearthing
of evidence, it is impossible to include all related material. Therefore,
trimming of the data was necessary.
For purposes of organization, I put forth a chronological timeline of
the discovery and documentation of global warming in the literature review. I
then continued this same chronological method in the findings section
pertaining to the conventions and protocols. This method of organization, I

29
feel, allows the reader to ascertain the pattern of participation in
environmental policies by the United States government.
Throughout the course of my research, I used first a convenience
sample, and then followed the paper trail throughout. The paper trail-going
from individual to individual and industry to industry-was the most
difficult to narrow down. In order to channel the findings, I decided to focus
on one main individual responsible for document alteration (Cooney) and a
few of the scientists he was censoring (namely Hansen and Piltz). A
subsequent search into the backgrounds of the individuals (namely
government appointed officials) revealed possible motivations of the state
actors. This allows the reader to grasp on a small scale what was occurring on
a much larger scale behind the scenes.
As for the methodological coding system, using the codes and note
cards proved to be very beneficial. It allowed for the organization and
inclusion/exclusion of data as it was deemed necessary. Originally, I started
with only five categories (EL-Environmental History, KP-Kyoto Protocol, EM
Economic Motivations, PM- Political Motivations and SC- State Crime
theory). Through the research and discovery process, I developed the
remaining five categories (EP- Environmental Protocols prior to the Kyoto
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Protocol, EL- Environmental Law, SI- Scientific Issues, BA- Actions of the
Bush Administration and DA- Document Alteration). These five were
emergent categories discovered at various points during the research process.
The only category in which I did not draw much evidence from was
that of environmental law. I was hoping to incorporate more evidence of legal
sanctions imposed on countries failing to meet the requirements of protocols
(such as fines) but found no place for it in this paper. In sum, this paper is
small in its scope, but perilous in its message: the environment cannot tolerate
another state crime, nor should the American people.

Qualitative Analysis: The Constant Comparison Method
The technique used here was adopted from a similar method first
employed by Barney Glaser (1965). The constant comparative method,
developed mid-study during research by Glaser on terminal hospital care,
involves "(1) comparing incidents applicable to each category (2) integrating
categories and their properties (3) delimiting the theory and (4) writing the
theory" (Glaser 1965: 439). The first and second portions of this method are
very beneficial to the research, as they help with the organization of topics
into categories. The first step was addressed by acquiring and comparing the
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data sources, and the subsequent dissection of them into categories. The
second was achieved by intermeshing first the data of one category, and then
linking that data with that of another category in order to create a fluid
interpretation. As a theory (state crime) has already-been secured as
sufficient, there is no need for steps three and four. Thus, we turn to both
Glaser and Strauss (1967) for the furthering of the constant comparison
method, and other qualitative research techniques.
The authors suggest coding and sorting the data into categories, and
then saturating the categories in an effort to recover as much as possible on
the topic of interest (i.e. once all possible data has been collected, so that the
data then becomes repetitive). This was achieved through the process
described earlier of following the "paper trail" through the convenience
sample. The goal is the elimination of selective observation on the part of the
researcher, and the preservation of objectivity throughout the research
process (Glaser and Strauss 1967). The point of this is to minimize the chance
of misconstruing the research (Glaser and Strauss 1967).
Summarily, the research will show how and why the actors on the
behalf of the United States (i.e. the Bush administration) went against
international compromise and commitment in order to serve their own vested
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interests (political and economical) in failing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in a
state crime of omission.
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CHAPTER IV
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE
Introduction to Findings
Findings regarding the pattern of US involvement in both protocols
prior to and then the Kyoto Protocol itself are discussed in this section. The
data discussed here were taken from pink note cards delineating general
environmental protocols, the Kyoto Protocol and environmental law. More
specifically, data reported here are from the following categories: EP, KP and
EL. Because of the categorical makeup (data pertaining to intergovernmental
laws, policies and protocols) all data were recorded on pink note cards, thus
easily grouped for chronological assessment. There were ten note cards
recorded for environmental law (EL), fourteen for environmental protocols
(EP) and twelve for the Kyoto Protocol (KP). The findings are as follows.
Introduction to International Environmental Law
International environmental law has been around for centuries, dating
back even to the Middle Ages. While these laws have persisted over time,
their focus has begun to shift dramatically over the past few decades. From
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property disagreements, to the preservation of wildlife and now, most
recently, the pollution of the atmosphere, international environmental law
has adapted to the changing governmental climate. According to Nanda
(1983) most international environmental law has abided by the Roman legal
maxim sic 'utero tuo ut alienum non laedas,' which essentially means "use
your property in such a manner as not to injure that of another" (Nanda 1983:
229). This statement seems an adequate description of the premise of
international environmental law. Sands (2003) asserts that
"[i]nternational environmental law comprises those substantive,
procedural and institutional rules of international law which
have as their primary objective the protection of the
environment" (15).
It is within the last two centuries that the United States has had interaction
with international environmental law, and the intentions of the nation
regarding the environment have changed, as have the laws.
Perhaps the first example of an international disagreement pertaining
to the United States was a dispute over the preservation of fur seals between
Britain and the United States in the late 1800's (Sands 2005). Because of an
increasing interest in the global market for the seals skins, the population of
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the animal was decreasing drastically. The United States fought a territorial
battle in order to protect the seals, and ultimately lost in a high court to the
British (Sands 2005). While international environmental law has certainly
progressed since this example, this was the first demonstration by the United
States that they were more interested in the environment over potential
economic gain (Sands 2005). This was a tradition that would continue for the
country until the turn of the 21st century.
Over the next century, the US participated in several environmental
protection policies and was even considered a leader by many in the fight to
preserve the ecosystem and everything in it (Sands 2003). Nearing the close of
the twentieth century, the United States participated (on various levels) in
every environmental protocol put forth following the Geneva Convention on
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution of 1979 (UNECE 12 Feb 2008).
From this Convention stemmed eight protocols that entered into force
between 1984 and 2003, were put forth by UNEP over the course of five years
and open to all states for participation (Sands 2003). The United States either
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participated in, signed, accepted and/or ratified8 each of these protocols
(UNECE 12 Feb 2008) which were designed to "protect human health and the
activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer" (Sands 2003:

344).
Save for a few limited exceptions, no treaty prior to 1979 was
developed for the main purpose of placing limits on the right of states to
unregulated atmospheric emissions which led to environmental destruction
(Sands 2003). Transboundary air pollution is the process in which pollutants
from one state cross the boundary into another, thus allowing cross
contamination and increased levels of pollution perpetrated by another state.
Under the principles of international law, no state has the right
to use or permit the use of territory in such a manor as to cause
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties
or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and
the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence
(Sands 2003: 318).
In an effort to exploit their own natural resources, states have the right to use
said resources pursuant to their own environmental policies. However, this
right ends where the rights of others begin, at the boundary line from one

8

There are four possible positions for a state to take on any given protocol or convention: ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession. While ratification is the most powerful of these, all positions
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state to the next. Article 10 of the 1987 Resolution on Transboundary Air
Pollution delineates the following:
...states shall be under duty to take all appropriate and effective
measures to ensure that their activities or those conducted
within their jurisdiction or under their control cause no
transboundary air pollution (Article 10 from the 1987 Resolution
on Transboundary Air Pollution, as quoted by Sands 2003: 322).
It was under this premise that the following environmental protocols were
established9.
Protocols of the Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution (1979)
The first protocol from the Geneva Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution (which began on November 13 1979 in Geneva)
was the 1985 Sulphur Protocol. This protocol (which was developed in
Helsinki, Finland on July 8, 1985 with 22 states as parties) was adopted due to
evidence of destruction to natural resources, historical monuments and
human health across both Europe and North America (Sands 2003). The
damage was due to the acidification of the environment from sulphur dioxide

indicate agreement from the state with the document at hand.
An excellent example oftransboundary air pollution is the 1931 Trail Smelter Case in which a
Canadian smelter plant was polluting air that then traveled into US territory. The US was subsequently
awarded $350,000 in damages. See Sands (2003) for further information.

9
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and nitrogen dioxide (among other pollutants) that stems from use of fossil
fuels (Sands 2003). The objective of the protocol was to reduce annual sulphur
emissions by 30 percent by 1993 (Sands 2003). In 1994, the Protocol for
Further Reductions of Sulphur Emissions was introduced. This time, only 27
parties participated in the protocol, as opposed to 42 the first time around.
And while the United States had not ratified either protocol, its leaders were
still in support of the actions taken by the ratifying parties (UNECE 12 Feb
2008).
The next protocol of interest from the Geneva Convention of 1979 is
the 1988 Nitrous Oxide (NO x) Protocol10, concerning the emissions of
nitrogen oxides and their transboundaries. This protocol (developed in Sofia,
Bulgaria on October 31, 1988 with 28 states as parties) calls for the reduction
of emissions of nitrogen oxides and encourages an "exchange of technology"
among the participating parties (Sands 2003: 329). Within six months of the
protocol entering into force, states must begin their negotiations to reduce
emissions. The exchange of technology is an important element of this
protocol, as it encouraged global participation instead of competition.
10

It should be noted that while the United States did not ratify the protocols pertaining to sulphur and
nitrous oxide emissions, they had committed to the 199 I Canada-US Air Quality Agreement which
already provided for regulation and reduction of both of these pollutants (Sands 2003).
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Unfortunately, common goals do not always win out over the competitive
edge, which will be demonstrated in the Kyoto Protocol.
In 1991, the Volatile Organic Compounds Protocol was developed on
November 18 in Geneva, Switzerland with 21 states as parties. This protocol
allotted for three different ways the states could reach the goal of reducing
emissions (which were mostly due to the incomplete combustion of fossil
fuels in motor vehicles) by 30 percent, which was to be specified when the
state signed the protocol (Sands 2003). Surprisingly, even with the flexible
schedule and methods for reaching reduction rates, only 23 parties ratified
this protocol (UNECE 12 Feb 2008).
The 1998 Aarhus Protocol on Heavy Metals was the next protocol
participated in by the United States. This protocol targeted three "particularly
harmful metals-lead, cadmium and mercury" (Sands 2003: 333) and was
developed in Aarhus on June 24, 1998. The protocol never entered force as it
failed to meet its requirements for ratification, only achieving 36 signatories
and 13 ratifications (Sands 2003). Parties of this protocol were required to
develop emissions standards based on the best technologies provided within
the protocol (Sands 2003). Concurrent to the Protocol on Heavy Metals was
the 1998 Aarhus Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants. With the intention
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to eradicate "discharges, emission and losses of POPs (persistent organic
pollutants) to the atmosphere" (Sands 2003: 334) the protocol also dealt with
the disposal of wastes and hazardous wastes (Sands 2003).
The last protocol from the Geneva Convention (1979) is that of the
1999 Gothenburg Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication 11 and
Ground-Level Ozone, which was held in Gothenburg, Sweden on November
30, 1999. It also has never entered into force as it did not meet requirements,
with only 31 signatories and four ratifications. In layman's terms, the
document seeks to reduce the anthropogenic emissions of four pollutants:
sulphur, nitrous oxide, ammonia and volatile organic compounds (VOCs), all
of which can have detrimental effects on "human health, the natural
ecosystem, materials and crops due to acidification, eutrophication, or ground
level ozone" (Sands 2003: 335).
The Montreal Protocol
Following the 1979 Geneva Conventions was the 1985 Vienna
Convention, out of which came the 1987 Montreal Protocol, and of which 184

11
Eutrophication is the process whereby lakes, streams and other bodies of water receive an excess of
nutrients, stimulating excessive plant and algae growth which can subsequently lead to the death of
organisms.
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states were parties (Sands 2003). This protocol is the only one to develop out
of the Vienna Convention to date, and was deemed
[a] landmark international environmental agreement, providing
a precedent for new regulatory techniques and institutional
arrangements, and the adoption and implementation of
innovative financial mechanisms. With hindsight, the Montreal
Protocol appears to be a relatively straightforward instrument,
and the fact that its approach has subsequently been relied upon
extensively in other international environmental negotiations
belies the controversy and complexity surrounding it at the time
of its negotiations (Sands 2003: 345-6).

According to Article 2(1), the objective of the Vienna Convention was to:
protect human health and the environment against adverse effects
resulting or likely to result from human activities which modify or are
likely to modify the ozone layer (Article 2(1), as quoted in Sands 2003:
344).
The Montreal Protocol establishes legal obligations that apply limitations and
reductions to the consumption and production of specific ozone-depleting
substances (Sands 2003). Article 4(2)a of the Montreal Protocol states that:
Each [Annex I Party12] shall adopt national policies and take
corresponding measure on the mitigation of climate change, by
12

Annex I parties are deemed to be "developed" countries; the most recent list includes: Australia,
Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European
Community, Finland, France, Gennany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States (UNFCCCa 14 Apr 2008).
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limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and
protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and
reservoirs. These policies and measures will demonstrate that
developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer
term trends in anthropogenic emission consistent with the
objective of this Convention, recognizing that the return by the
end of the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol would contribute to such
modification; and taking into account the differences in these
parties' starting points and approaches, and sustainable
economic growth, available technologies and other individual
circumstances, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate
contrib_utions by each of these parties to the global effort
regarding that objective. These parties may implement such
policies contributing to the achievement of the Convention ....
(Article 4(2) as quoted in Sands 2003: 364).
As previously stated, the Montreal Protocol sought to limit and reduce the
levels of consumption and production of ozone depleting substances. While
this premise is nothing new to the community of environmental law, the
"negotiation and conclusion [ of the protocol] ....were prompted
by new scientific evidence indicating that emissions of certain
substances were significantly depleting and modifying the
ozone layer that would have potential climatic effects" (Sands
2003: 346).
The Montreal Protocol is significant in that it is a precursor to the Kyoto
Protocol. It was within the Montreal Protocol that developmental needs for
developing countries were first recognized and accounted for (Sands 2003).
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Special provisions were made for China and India, who were
"otherwise unwilling to participate due to economic and developmental
implications of the protocol" (Sands 2003: 354). In response, the protocol
allowed longer grace periods in which to adjust to the new requirements and
regulations of the protocol for the developing countries. Along with special
provisions for developing countries were provisions set aside for developed
countries. The United States, along with eleven other countries, were
permitted to reduce their emissions to 35 percent of their 1991 levels, as
opposed to 30 percent as originally required by the protocol (US Department
of State 12 Feb 2008). This was the first of many special requirements
formatted to fit the needs of the United States. The Montreal Protocol was
also one of the first to recognize the environmental severity of current
emissions rates, and perhaps this is what encouraged the compromises;
participation at any level could only be beneficial to the final outcome.
The Kyoto Protocol
The 1992 Climate Change Convention (CCC) was the birthplace of the
Kyoto Protocol, which (developed in Kyoto, Japan) was adopted and opened
up for signing on December 11, 1997 (UNFCCC). Ambassador Raul Estrada-
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Oyuela, chair of the Committee of the Whole which was established to
facilitate the text of the protocol, stated that "[t]his agreement will have a real
impact on the problem of greenhouse gas emissions. Today should be
remembered as the Day of the Atmosphere" (UNEP 1997). Both the
Convention and the development of the protocol were no small feat; in fact,
they marked a significant moment in the history of international
environmental law.
The [CCC] was the first international environmental agreement
to be negotiated by virtually the whole of the international
. community with 143 states participating in the final session of
the INC/UNFCCC, and is potentially unique in the scope of its
direct and indirect consequences: it is difficult to identify any
type of human activity which will, over time, fall outside of its
scope (Sands 2003: 359-60).
This is a pertinent point made by Sands; the regulations that are imposed by
the Convention and the protocol will govern emissions of participating
countries on a continual basis. While this may seem drastic, the Convention
and the protocol were developed so as to include as many nations as possible,
thus reducing the economic burden for everyone (Sands 2003). This
considered, the protocol took a comprehensive approach to
...implementing environmental considerations into economic
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development and defined, in legal terms, rights and obligations
of different members of the international community in the
quest for 'sustainable development' and the protection of the
global climate (Sands 2003: 360).
Considering the economic issues with the protocol, its major achievement
would be the attainment of commitment of Annex I parties to meet their
emissions reductions targets on a preapproved timetable (Sands 2003).
The ultimate goal of the climate treaty to which the Kyoto protocol is
attached is stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases
at levels that will avoid "danger" to economies and ecosystems
(Jacoby, Prinn and Schmalensee, 1998, p.59).
In order to enter into effect, the protocol required the ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession 13 of at least 55 of the 143 states from the Convention;
this must include states that are responsible for at least 55 percent of carbon
dioxide emissions from Annex I parties in 1990 (Sands 2003).
The United States is the largest producer of poisonous emissions in the
atmosphere, contributing over 30 percent of global warming; Europe is
second (27.7 percent) and Russia third (13.7 percent) (Gore 2006). The
remaining populations (Canada, Japan, Southeast Asia, India, China, the

13

The signing of a protocol is an indication of general support for its objectives, and of an intention to
later become a party to the Protocol; however it is not legally binding to the state. A state must deposit
an "instrument of ratification, accession, acceptance or approval with the Depositary-the Secretary
General of the United Nations"-that will then legally bind that state to the provisions provided by the
Protocol ninety days after the instrument was deposited, provide that protocol has already entered into
force at that time (Convention on Biological Diversity 2008).
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Middle East, Australia, Africa, Central America and South America)
combined do not even equal the United States in emissions (Gore 2006).
As for the failure of the United States to join the Kyoto Protocol,
McCright and Dunlap (2003) find several places to lay blame.
... [O]n-July 25, 1997, the United States Senate unanimously (95-0)
passed Senate Resolution 98 (also referred to as the Hagel-Byrd
Resolution) which notified the Clinton Administration that the Senate
would not ratify any treaty that would: (a) impose mandatory
greenhouse gas emission reductions for the United States without also
imposing such reductions for developing nations, or (b) result in
serious harm to our economy. Thus, at the end of the Clinton
Administration, the Kyoto Protocol lay dormant with little likelihood
of being ratified by the Senate. Then, in March 2001, President George
W. Bush renounced any plans to establish carbon dioxide emissions
reductions for U.S. power plants and subsequently announced that the
U.S. had no intention of abiding by the Kyoto Protocol-an act which
provoked international dismay and hostility (McCright and Dunlap,
2003: 349).
Because the United States chose not to ratify the protocol, the participation of
other major emitters (such as the European Community, Russia and Japan)
became imperative to the protocol. It was the ratification from these nations
that finally allowed for the protocol to enter into force on February 16, 2005
(UNFCCCa). These actions demonstrated that the global community was
prepared and ready to support the Kyoto Protocol, even without past
environmental regulation leader, the United States.
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Misconceptions of the Kyoto Protocol
A major misconception of the Kyoto Protocol is that it was designed to
implement new environmental regulations and commitments; in actuality, its
purpose is to reiterate existing commitments that were developed during the
CCC, namely Articles 4.1 and 4.2 (Sands 2003; UNFCCC; Davies 1998). The
general commitments of these articles respectively:
include the development of national inventories of anthropogenic
emissions by sources and removals by sinks14 of all greenhouse gases
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol and the formulation and
implementation of national and, where appropriate, regional
programs containing measures to mitigate climate change by
addressing emissions and removals of these gases and by facilitation of
adequate adaptation to climate change (Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the
protocol as described by Sands 2003: 362).
The protocol was developed at a meeting of the parties in Berlin following the
CCC, and thus named 'The Berlin Mandate' denotes the underlying purpose
of the protocol:
[a]im, as to the priority in the process of strengthening the
commitments in Article 4.2.(a) and (b) of the Convention, for
developed country/other Parties included in Annex I, both to
elaborate policies and measures, as well as to set quantified
limitation and reduction objectives within specified timeframes,
such as 2005, 2010, and 2020, for their anthropogenic emissions
14

Sinks, also called carbon sinks, are the opposite of a carbon dioxide source; it is instead an absorber
of carbon dioxide, such as forests or wetlands (Manguiat, Verheyen, Mackensen and Scholz 2005).
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by sources and removal by sinks of greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol (Report from the Berlin
Mandate as quoted by Sands 2003: 369).
The protocol specifically looked at policies pertaining to energy, transport,
industry, agriculture, forestry, waste management, economic instruments,
institutions and mechanisms (Sands 2003).
Emissions Trading
Perhaps the most ground-breaking aspect of the Kyoto Protocol is the
development of emissions trading. 'Emissions trading' is the idea that if one
country has kept emissions below their allotted amount, they may sell
remaining emissions credits to another country that may have surpassed
theirs. The idea of buying and selling emissions have led critics to remark that
emissions are the new 'hot commodity' as they can be traded and tracked like
any other article of commerce. This has led to the development of the 'carbon
market,' as carbon dioxide is the primary culprit of fossil fuel emissions
(UNFCCCb).
Though innovative, emissions trading is also a highly controversial
aspect of the protocol (Davies 1998; Sands 2003). "The inclusion of emissions
trading in the Protocol was strongly supported by the United States, which,"
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asserts Sands .(2003), "has domestic experience with similar schemes" (373).
The United States argued that emissions trading would be a cost-effective
method to assist nations to meet their emissions goals. Many other nations,
however, strongly opposed this method (such as China and other developing
nations) because it would present the disadvantage of trying to develop a
surplus to trade emissions while simultaneously developing their industrial
base. In a compromise, emissions trading was allowed on the basis that they
were used only as a supplemental means to reach emissions goals, and were
not the sole method used by any country (Davies 1998; Sands 2003).
Joint Implementation and ERUs
Another new addition in the Kyoto Protocol was the inclusion of joint
implementation (JI). Article 6(1) regarding joint implementation provides that
an Annex I party may trade to or from any other Annex I party
emission reduction credits resulting from projects aimed at
reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing
anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any
sector of the economy (Article 6(1) as quoted by Sands 2003:
373).
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JI was designed as an economic incentive, and even authorized private legal
entities to participate in the transfer of emission reduction credits (ERUs). As
with emissions trading, any JI action must result in the reduction of emissions
in one way or another, and must only be a supplementary method of
achieving this (Sands 2003).
Clean Development Mechanism and Sinks
Another method to obtain ERU credits is by way of the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM). This encourages Annex I countries to
participate and develop projects in Non-Annex I countries to assist in the
reductions of emissions in developing countries. Annex I parties can obtain
emissions credits to help with the attainment of their emissions goals (Davies
1998; Sands 2003). A portion of the proceeds from these projects is to be used
to assist the developing country with the financial burden of adaptation.
The inclusion of sinks into the protocol was another controversial
issue. Once again, the United States was a huge proponent of its inclusion, as
it would allow for activities that "resulted in carbon sequestration" (Sands
2003: 374) such as afforestation, reafforestation, and land-use changes. These
activities would then count towards the commitments of the nation that
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participated in them, offering economic relief-something specifically sought
after by the United States (Sands 2003). Opposite the United States, the
European Community was strongly opposed to the incorporation of
emissions credits in exchange for sinks, as it was seen as another way out of
an actual reductions commitment (Sands 2003).
Opposition to the Kyoto Protocol
Foreign Opposition
Developing countries were first to vocalize opposition to the protocol.
Regulations on their emissions would drastically slow their economic and
industrial growth, a debate that has been at' the forefront of the Kyoto
Protocol since its birth (Davies 1998). The argument is that developed
countries faced no restrictions on their emissions during their industrial
expansion periods. Placing restrictions on developing countries now would
not allow them these same opportunities. In this regard, these countries made
it known that they would not participate in the protocol without the
participation of the major Annex I parties. Upon the announcement from the
US that it would not ratify the protocol, many thought it was the lid on the
coffin for Kyoto. The ratifications from Japan, Russia and the UK helped to tip
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the emissions scale that was disproportionately weighted by the United States
(Bee 2007; Kluger 2006; Sands 2003; and Sands 2005). The Preamble to the
CCC outlines this issue:
...the largest share of historical and current global emissions of
greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that
per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively
low and that the share of global emissions originating in
developing countries will grow to meet their social and
development needs (the CCC as quoted in Davies 1998: 450).
The countries most concerned with these developmental issues were India
and China (Sands 2003), both of which have now accepted and approved the
protocol respectively (UNFCCCb). Brazil and Malaysia had concerns about
the deforestation regulations imposed by the protocol, and both countries
since ratified the protocol in 2005 (UNFCCCb).
Aside from these countries, the only other major opposition to the
Kyoto Protocol (excluding the United States) came from major oil producing
countries, like Saudi Arabia. Countries on this bandwagon had high hopes
that all negotiations surrounding the protocol would fail, and that it would
never reach the 55 nations needed for ratification (Sands 2003). Restrictions
enforced by the protocol would also mean significant economic concerns for
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these countries. Saudi Arabia never signed the protocol, but has since
accepted it in 2005 (UNFCCCb).

United States Opposition
Although the US had signed the protocol by the hand of President
Clinton in March of 1998, commitment to the protocol would not go any
further. Although the signing was meant to be an indication of intent to ratify,
the change in presidential administration "altered the US position regarding
the protocol" as the new administration took no steps toward the ratification
process in order to implement the protocol (US Rejection 2001: 648). The
United States and Kazakhstan were the only two nations to sign and then not
ratify the protocol (Sands 2003; UNFCCCb).
The Bush administration maintained that they did not want to ratify
the protocol because it fostered unequal regulations for developing countries,
and it had the potential to harm the US economy (Sands 2005). Varying US
government officials at the ninth Annual Energy Efficiency Forum (June 10
1998) stated that threats from the Kyoto Protocol to the economy came if the
way of: drastic energy price increases, job losses in manufacturing industries,
a decline in the standard of living, and a one-third increase in gas prices by
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2010 (Schuler Jr. 1998). Ironically enough, gas prices have skyrocketed in the
US even without the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. In 1998, the average
price of a gallon of gas was roughly $1.20 (EIA 2008). If the predictions made
by those who opposed the protocol had come true, the average price would
now still be less than $1.60/gallon. However, gas is already more than twice
that amount. Supporters of the Kyoto Protocol at the Energy Efficiency
Forum argued that those opposed to the Kyoto Protocol were "the same
Chicken Little advocates who [had] made the same arguments for every
environmental effort that [has been] made, going back to the initial Clean Air
Act" (Schuler Jr. 1998). These advocates believed that the economic figures
put forth by opposition widely overestimated the impacts of Kyoto, and
failed to consider the economic relief from the inclusion of emissions trading
and sinks into the protocol (Schuler Jr. 1998).
During the negotiations of the Berlin Mandate, the chief US negotiator
stated to the conference:

...although the United States does not intend to ratify the
agreement, we have not sought to stop others from moving
ahead, so long as legitimate U.S. interests were protected ...At
the same time, the United States must emphasize that our not
blocking consensus on the adoption of these Kyoto Protocol
rules does not change our view that the Protocol is not sound
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policy. ...given the...exclusion of developing countries from its
emissions limitation requirements. The decisions made today
with r�spect to the Protocol, in addition, reinforce our
conclusion that the treaty is not workable for the United
States...[additional elements] which we do not support include,
for example: an institution to assess compliance with emissions
targets that is dominated by developing country members
without targets, more favorable treatment for Parties operating
within a regional economic integration organization relative to
other Parties and rules that purport to change treaty
commitments through decisions of the Parties rather than
through the proper amendment procedure.
The United States came to this Conference to engage with other
governments on the pressing global climate change problem.
We have benefited from the opportunities to explain the Bush
Administration's approach, to listen to the views of others, and
to better understand different perspectives. ..We look forward
to continuing productive discussions...The Bush Administration
takes tJ:le issue of climate change very seriously and we will not
abdicate our responsibilities (Dobriansky 2005; Environmental
Science and Health Affairs 2001: 647).
This action taken by the US came off as self-serving to not only United States
citizens, but also to the global community, and severed many political ties to
the United States (Sands 2005). In an even bolder move, the United States
asserted the belief that the development of a country is "not a right" but
instead a goal of every nation (Sands 2003: 265-66). Obviously, the United
States government had goals of its own. International environmental
agreements o�fer a backdrop to what was occurring globally concerning the
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environment. The next chapter will explore the happenings within the United
States during the Bush administration.
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CHAPTER V
THE ACHILLES HEEL
Introduction to Findings
Findings pertaining to the economic and political motivations of the
Bush administration are delineated here. Issues of document alteration and
suppression, as well as the censorship of scientists are all discussed in this
section. The data discussed here were taken from both blue and white note
cards, which includes the following: economic issues and motivations,
political motivations, scientific issues, actions of the Bush administration, and
document alteration. More specifically, data reported here are from the
following categories: EM, PM, BA, DA and SI. Because of the categorical
makeup (data pertaining to US governmental actions and policies, and
addition scientific issues) and all data were recorded on blue and white note
cards. There were eight note cards recorded for economic motivations (EM);
ten note cards for political motivations (PM); seventeen for document
alteration (DA), sixteen for the Bush administration (BA), and six for scientific
issues (SI). The findings are as follows.
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How the Bush Administration Neutralized their Biggest Opponent: The
Environment
It was the Republican party that first began using the phrase 'climate
change' instead of 'global warming' when addressing current environmental
concerns. They felt it was less threatening, and less likely to alert the public of
looming environmental issues (Kennedy Jr. 2004) which discouraged any
public opposition of their policies and actions. For a while now, the
environment has been termed the 'Achilles heel' of the Republican party
(Kennedy Jr. 2004), so it's no surprise they would find any issue pertaining to
it to be threatening. The inauguration of President George W. Bush set in
motion the start of what was and still is an eight year campaign of broken
environmental promises. The Kyoto Protocol was at the forefront of this
operation.
Before Bush even took office, the energy industry offered support to
the 2000 election campaign by contributing more than $48.3 million to George
W. Bush and the Republican party. Another $58 million has been donated
since Bush's inauguration in January of 2001 (Kennedy Jr. 2004). After he
entered the White House, Bush stacked his cabinet against the environment.
Thirty-one of 48 appointees have ties to the energy industry (Kennedy Jr.
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2004). To be more specific, "four cabinet secretaries, the six most powerful
White House officials, and more than 20 high-level appointees are alumni of
the [energy] industry and its allies" (Kennedy Jr. 2004: 96). The cabinet also
has more past corporate CEO's than any other cabinet in history (Kennedy Jr.
2004). Condoleezza Rice, an integral part of the Bush administration, even
had a Chevron oil tanker named after her because of her contributions to the
company (Kennedy Jr. 2004). Obviously, the appointments were in the
interests of the administration and the industries, not the environment.
Almost all the top positions at the agencies that protect our
environment and oversee our resources have been filled by former
lobbyists for the biggest polluters in the very businesses that these
ministries oversee (Kennedy Jr. 2004: 5).
These appointments made by Bush allow the public to see where his political
(and environmental) alliances truly lie.
While campaigning, President Bush made a speech in Michigan
describing his "comprehensive energy policy" (US Rejection 2001: 648).
As we promote electricity and renewable energy, we will work
to make our air cleaner. With the help of Congress,
environmental groups and industry, we will require all power
plants to meet clean air standards in order to reduce emissions
of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, mercury and carbon dioxide
within a reasonable period of time. And we will provide
market-based incentives, such as emissions trading, to help
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industry achieve the required reductions (Murphy 2002: 176).
This speech led many to believe that Bush was on board with the Kyoto
Protocol, and many took it as a pledge that he would follow the protocols'
objectives (US Rejection 2001). This, however, was not the case. When Bush
took office, he stated that the Kyoto Protocol was "fatally flawed in
fundamental ways," and his administration refused to support it (Singer and
Avery 2007: 222). This was an immediate turnaround from what was
anticipated from the administration. President Bush has since maintained his
refusal to regulate CO2 emissions. He recently stated
I told the world I thought the Kyoto deal was a lousy deal for America.
It meant that we had to cut emissions below 1990 levels which would
have meant I would have presided over massive lay offs and economic
destruction (President George W. Bush, as quoted in BBC News 2007).
Ironically enough, the economy has not fared well under the Bush
administration as it is, environmental regulation or not. An abbreviated
history of Bush's environmental past provides answers to his questionable
decisions regarding environmental policy.
During Bush's term as governor in Texas, the state "ranked number
one in both air and water pollution" (Kennedy Jr. 2004: 5). In his first term of
presidency, Bush shielded coal-burning power plants from prosecution when

61
it was found that they had violated the Clean Air Act (one of Bush's few
environmental policies), and then went even further by excusing them from
compliance with the Act (Kennedy Jr. 2004). Bush also advocates a "cleanup
schedule written by polluters for polluters" that will take several generations
to complete (Kennedy Jr. 2004: 7). A track record like this (from both Bush
and his cabinet) is sure to produce a far from picture perfect finish.
Many have stated that an imperative role of the government, in any
environmental plan, is to both promote new technologies and provide
incentives for actions that lead to the reduction of emissions (White 1996;
Sands 2003). The Bush administration has been less than inspirational.
Many environmentalists declared the Bush administration
hopele?s from the start, and while that may have been
premature, it's undeniable that the White House's
environmental record-from abandonment of Kyoto to the
Presidents' broken campaign pledge to control carbon output, to
the relaxation of emissions standards-has been dismal (Kluger
2006: 7).
Perhaps the environmentalists were the only ones paying attention from the
start when Bush halted all environmental regulations on the very day he was
inaugurated (Kennedy Jr. 2004). These actions from the Bush administration
came at a time when a majority of the American public were in favor of more
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strict environmental policies. Since then, support of environmental
restrictions has only increased, while environmental protection has stood still,
or decreased in some instances (Sands 2003). A recent poll conducted by
Time, ABC News and Stanford University concluded that 87 percent of the
general public was in favor of the government requiring, or at least
encouraging, a drastic lowering in power plant emissions (Kluger 2006).
Eighty-five percent stated that there should be greater pressure to increase
fuel efficiency in motor vehicles (Kluger 2006). In spite of this, Bush appointed
Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham (a former Michigan Senator who received
$700,000 from the automotive industry during his one-year term in office)
whose specific desire was to do-away-with automotive fuel efficiency
initiatives (Kennedy Jr. 2004).
Despite the wishes of environmental activists and even the general
public, environmental concerns were not on the minds of those wandering
the halls of the White House. Instead,
[o]ther, more immediate, concerns typically occupy the
agenda - securing economic growth, protecting the energy
supplies that fuel us and fighting a global war against terrorism
(Bee 2007: 17).
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While certainly these concerns are warranted in their own right, they do not
justify ignorance towards remaining issues. However it seemed that the Bush
administration was not willing to take on any endeavor that would not prove
profitable to them. Indeed, "[o]ver the short term, laws adopted to protect the
environment can impose potentially significant economic costs" (Sands 2003:
8). But in the long run, dealing with these issues now (or ideally, ten years
ago) will help· to diminish the potential costs if no action is taken. Though
economic affairs are a common roadblock to environmental agreements,
"[t]he progress of international environmental law reflects the close
relationship between environmental protection and economic development"
(Sands 2003: 8). In this way, lawmakers are careful to consider the economic
implications of any new international environmental law. Sands (2003) argues
that "...developed countries will be well placed to benefit from the adoption
of stringent enviro!1mental standards including the advantages gained from
the sale of environmentally sound technology ..." to developing countries (8).
Considering this, one might think the Bush administration would be jumping
onto the bandwagon of environmental technology. But the rewards (both
environmental and economic) will be not be recognized for several years, and
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the Bush administration seems more focused on what is profitable today,
instead of what will be beneficial in the future.
The Bush Approach
When George W. Bush first assumed presidency, he asked the
UNFCCC for a delay in the negotiations concerning the Kyoto Protocol so
that the United States could re-examine its position. After he announced that
there would be no ratification on the part of the US (in March of 2001), he
soon made public his plans for "voluntary actions, increased scientific
research and market mechanisms" in June of 2001 (Bee 2007: 23). On February
14, 2002, President Bush declared his new approach to reducing greenhouse
gases by ten percent over ten years, from 2002 to 2012 (Bee 2007). This new
approach involved intensity targets instead of the absolute emissions targets15
specified in the Kyoto Protocol. This goal, Bush announced, was to be met
entirely by voluntary action, not regulation (Bee 2007). If it was found that the
plan was not "on track" in 2012, the US would then take additional measures
and include a "broad market program..." only if "...sound science justifi[ed]
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The United States ranks fiftieth in the world for carbon intensity emissions, which are essentially the
physical quantity of emissions divided by GDP. Obviously, this level rises and falls, and reducing
emissions based off of a projected GDP can sometimes actually lead to an increase in emissions. As for
absolute carbon emissions, the US ranks first (Bee 2007).
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further policy action" (Bee 2007: 24). Naturally; the Bush administration
would be well out of office by 2012 and would have no further obligations to
this project.
In his first term, President Bush not only failed to participate in
environmental programs on the international level, but even proposed a
budget that included "double digit cuts in research at the EPA, the U.S.
Geological Survey, the Department of Agriculture, and the Energy
Department's Office of Science, among others" in his own nation (Kennedy
2004: 77). These cuts included the following: $270 million from EPA programs
designed to clean up lakes, rivers and streams nationally; $31 million from
programs designed to specifically deal with air pollution programs; the entire
elimination of a $10 million program to restore air quality in the most
polluted communities in California; $5 million in EPA programs to restore the
San Francisco Bay; and the elimination of all funding that was supposed to be
used to track global warming pollution (Environmental News Service 2008).
Alongside these cuts, Bush was praising alternative fuel sources while
still giving "rhetorical nods to America's oil addiction" (Kluger 2006: 7). In
2001, the Bush administration removed Dr. Robert Watson (a NASA
atmospheric chemist) from his position as head of the IPCC (Kennedy Jr.
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2004). Watson, who was disliked (to put it kindly) by the oil and coal
industries, was removed at the behest of ExxonMobil, and replaced by a
mediocre scientist from New Delhi, India, "who would be generally
unavailable for congressional hearings" and subsequently unable to explain,
uphold and defend environmental policies (Kennedy Jr. 2004: 88). These
actions may be based on the premise that President Bush still believes that
global warming is a natural phenomenon uninfluenced by human activity. Or
perhaps it is his concern for economics over the environment.
...Mr. Bush has clearly been unwilling to commit the United
States to the cost of building ...a new energy system ...Also, [he]
has been equally unwilling to reject man-made global warming
as a myth, when many voters believed it was a real danger to
the country and the planet (Singer and Avery 2007: 223).
All things considered, the Bush administration does not appear to be placing
the environment as a priority. In fact, environmental concerns appear to take
a back seat to most everything. One could say that the administration has
successfully beaten its biggest enemy, and conquered its Achilles' heel.
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Document Alteration and Censorship
It can be expected that any document generated by the government
will undergo a review process that may include alterations and/or editing
before the document is released to the press and public. However, one should
be able to trust that the integrity of the document would be maintained and
protected throughout this process, or at the very least, its general message. In
this instance, however, it "appears climate science is edited with a heavy
hand" (Rewriting the Science 2006).
Since the Bush administration has taken office, accusations of severe
document alteration have been circling the White House. Environmentalists
and politicians alike have been outraged by the constant censorship of climate
research and findings.
. . . [O]f all the debates in the scientific arena, however, there is none in
which the White House has cooked the books more than that of global
warming (Kennedy 2004: 83).
Kennedy also asserts that since 2001, the White House has "altered,
suppressed or attempted to discredit over a dozen major reports on the
subject" (Kennedy 2004: 83). Included in these reports are peer-reviewed
documents from the IPCC that were originally commissioned by the former
President Bush in 1993. The document failed to provide satisfactory results to
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the Bush administration, as it confirmed that industrial emissions were
responsible for global warming (Kennedy 2004). The attempts of this
administration to twist scientific fact in a mechanism of trickery in an effort to
consolidate its power and justify its economic agenda have been likened to
the Inquisition (Kennedy 2004). In an interview in 2003, Roger G. Kennedy,
former director of the National Park Service, stated that:
...this administration routinely mismanages scientific information
through distortion and omission whenever scientific truth is
inconvenient to its industrial allies. It's hard to decide what is more
demoralizing about the administration's politicization of the scientific
process-its disdain for professional scientists working for out
government or its willingness to deceive the American public
(Kennedy 2004: 87).
This "mismanagement" is so routine that when the EPA released its annual
report on air pollution in September of 2002, it was missing its usual update
on global warming. The update was "missing" because it had been
intentionally deleted by Bush appointees serving in the White House
(Kennedy 2004). In June of 2003, the State of the Environment report (which
had been commissioned by the EPA in 2001) was released only after
information pertaining to global warming had been expunged by individuals
in the Bush administration (Kennedy 2004). In place of the missing data was a
propaganda article developed and funded by the American Petroleum
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Institute (Kennedy 2004), which only further demonstrates the inside ties to
the energy, or more specific, the oil industry.
In fact, dozens of federal agencies report on climate science, but these
reports are heavily edited at the White House before being sent on to
Congress, and finally the public (Rewriting the Science 2006). In 2003, the
EPA successfully leaked a document that had been censored and withheld by
the higher-ups of the agency. The document was a Senate plan that could
reduce the main pollutants responsible for global warming for a relatively
low cost (Kennedy Jr. 2004). When this document was released, President
Bush retaliated by enacting at 10-year, $100 million research endeavor in an
effort to prove that global warming is a natural (not man-made) process
(Kennedy Jr. 2004). It seems Bush was committed to spending any amount
necessary to disprove what scientists across the world had already found to
be true.
An anonymous senior EPA scientist (who hides his identity due to the
fact that he is forbidden to speak to reporters without special clearance) said
that the constant alteration of documents by Bush appointees had "damaged
morale," adding that many scientists are becoming discouraged and
frustrated (Revkin 2005).
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Silencing of Scientists
Perhaps the most well known of these scientists is James Hansen,
director of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS), specializing
in climate research. Hansen is one of the most well known researchers on
climatology this century. When asked about the reliability of Hansen's work,
Ralph Cicerone (the President of the National Academy of Sciences, the
nation's leading science institute) said the following:
I can't think of anybody who I would say is better than Hansen. You
might argue that there are two or three others as good, but nobody
better (Rewriting the Science 2006).
Hansen has been in the media over the past few years because of accusations
aimed at the Bush administration. He has, on several occasions, pointed the
finger at the White House for censoring his reports and his interviews with
the press (Eilperin 2005; Revkin 2005; Revkin 2006; Rewriting the Science
2006). In an interview with 60 Minutes, Hansen reiterated his feelings.
I object to the fact that I'm not able to freely communicate via the
media. National Public Radio (NPR) wanted to interview me and they
were told they would need to interview someone at NASA
headquarters...I think we should be able to communicate the science
(Rewriting the Science 2006).
When 60 Minutes asked Hansen if he believes the administration is censoring
what he can say to the public, he said he did.
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Or they're censoring whether or not I can say it. I mean, I say what I
believe if I'm allowed1 6 to say it (Rewriting the Science 2006).
It seems many other scientists feel the same way Hansen does:
Lawmakers received survey results of federal scientists that showed 46
percent felt pressure to eliminate the words "climate change," "global
warming" or similar terms from communications about their work.
The scientists also reported 435 instances of political interference in
their work over the past five years (MSNBC 2007).
Obviously, censorship was reaching new levels in the field of environmental
research and protection.
In 2004, the GISS received an email regarding a "new review process"
that was to be implemented immediately. The email explained that the White
House would now be "reviewing all climate related press releases" (Rewriting
the Science 2006). These new policies likely stemmed from actions taken in
2003 by John Graham (the Administrator of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs [OIRA], Office of Management and Budget) who
orchestrated an overhaul in policy and procedure in the generation and
release of scientific information (Kennedy Jr. 2004). Instead of employing
outside experts to 'peer review' proposed plans and regulations-as had been
done in the past-Graham advocated a strictly internal review process
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Italics added.
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centralized in his office (Kennedy Jr. 2004). This would allow for the findings
of scientific uncertainty, the shielding industries from regulation, and the
freeing of their polluting possibilities. In opposition to Graham's new policies
are: the National Academy of Scientists, the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, the Federation of American Scientists, and the
Association of American Medical Colleges (Kennedy Jr. 2004).
In response to this, along with the action of altering of documents,
Hansen was appalled:
[i]n my more than three decades in the government I've never
witnessed such restrictions on the ability of scientists to communicate
with the public (Rewriting the Science 2006).
Government officials and cabinet members reacting to statements by Hansen
have only denied them, and continue to defend the integrity of their offices
(Eilperin 2005). They also assert that Hansen is not one to be making policy
judgments, especially ones that would involve the economy (Eilperin 2005).
While that assessment may be fair, it certainly does not absolve the
government of making decisions regarding the environment when necessary.
According to Kluger (2006), Bush appointees are trying to "deny the science"
(8). In fact, it seems many environmental groups are so discouraged by White
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House actions that they have resolved to "wait out this administration and
hope for something better in 2009" (Kluger 2006: 8).
Rick Piltz, former senior associate for the U.S. Climate Change Science
Program (CCSP), also spoke out against the censorship of climate change to
the public, stating that his documents were edited to appear less threatening
(Rewriting the Science 2006).
Each administration has a policy position on climate change, but I have
not seen a situation like the one that has developed under this
administration during the past four years, in which politicization by
the White House has fed back directly into the science program in such
a way as to undermine the credibility and integrity of the program
(Rick Piltz, as quoted in Revkin 2005).
Piltz eventually resigned from his position in March of 2005 after 14 years of
service for the government. In his resignation letter, Piltz stated the following
as a major reason for his resignation:
I believe the overarching problem is that the administration-acting
primarily through key positions in the Executive Office of the
President, and to some extent the State Department, and aligning itself
with some of its key allies-does not want and has acted to impede
forthright communication of the state of climate science and its
implications for society. I know I am not alone in believing that the
administration's political and policy commitments have had a
deleterious effect on some essential aspects of the USGCRP/CCSP
(Piltz 2005: 1).

74
Philip Cooney, then Chief of Staff at the White House Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ), is accused of altering documents put forth by
Piltz. Cooney made several alterations to Piltz's reports in order to make
them less threatening (Rewriting the Science 2006). For example, in a report
by the CCSP, Cooney altered the sentence "the earth is undergoing rapid
change" to read "the earth may be undergoing rapid change" (Rewriting the
Science 2006), thus changing scientific certainty to scientific speculation. The
sentence "energy production contributes to warming" was simply taken out of
the document (Rewriting the Science 2006). The blatant removal of
information pertaining to "energy production" may indicate a direct link to
the energy industry. When asked about his opinion of the alterations, Piltz
stated that
[Cooney] was obviously passing it through a political screen. He
would put in the words "potential" or "may weaken" or delete text that
had to do with the likely consequence of climate change, and pump up
uncertainty language throughout (Rewriting the Science 2006).
In addition to all this, any statements in the document regarding human
health were simply cut out.
Cooney, before being appointed by President Bush, was a lawyer and
lobbyist for the American Petroleum Institute (Rewriting the Science 2006).
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Many disagreed with Bush's decision to appoint Cooney for several reasons,
the most obvious being the fact that he has no scientific background. In fact,
Cooney only has a bachelor's degree in economics, which seemed far from
adequate to many in the field (Revkin 2005). Another issue with Cooney is
that, for several years, he lobbied against environmental policies and
restrictions on behalf of the American Petroleum Institute. Many argued that
this clearly presented a conflict of interest (Revkin 2005).
Cooney resigned in 2005 after it became public that he had altered
climate documents in order to downplay the scientific consensus of global
warming, namely documents from Piltz. Soon after his resignation, Cooney
went to work for ExxonMobil, although they would not comment as to his
specific employment responsibilities (Revkin 2005). When asked why he
altered the documents, Cooney states that his "sole loyalty was to the
president and to advance the policies of his administration" (Revkin 2005). In
a sworn statement before the House panel, Cooney stated that it was his duty
to "align executive branch reports with Bush administration policy" (Morello
2007). From this statement alone one can deduce that the policies that the
Bush administration wanted to advance did not pertain to the environment.
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Cooney, however, could was not the only one censoring scientific
information from the public.
Forty three percent of [government employed scientists] reported edits
during.review of their work that changed the meaning of their
findings. Forty six percent felt administrativerequirements that
impaired climate-related work. Sixty seven percent said the
environment for federal government climate research is worse now
than five years ago (MSNBC 2007).
In rebuttal to statements made by scientists like Piltz and Hansen, the current
administration likes to flaunt its expenditures in climate research. Indeed, the
Bush administration has spent more than any other prior administration in
this field. The administration has also been the most hesitant to take any
action regarding environmental issues (Rewriting the Science 2006). Many
believe the administration is using said research as an excuse to stall any
action regarding climate change. According to Piltz,
[t]he strategy of people with a political agenda to avoid this issue is to
say there is so much to study way up stream here that we can't even
begin to discuss impact and response strategies. There's too much
uncertainty. It's not the climate scientists that are saying this, it's
lawyers and politicians (Rewriting the Science 2006).
In this way, the administration continually emphasizes what we don't know,
while downplaying what we do know (Kennedy Jr. 2004). This reluctance to
act, according to Hansen, is a bad idea. Even though the administration wants
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to wait ten years in order to evaluate climate change, the "delay of another
decade, [Hansen argues], is a colossal risk" (Revkin 2006).
When the administration cannot silence scientists who want to speak
out about global warming, they turn the ones they can, and then hire and
appoint those who are more willing to play along. In a passionate statement,
Robert F. Kennedy Jr. states the following:
[c]rooked scientists on industry payroll, housed in fancy think tanks
that publish junk science-to persuade the public that there are no
environmental crises and to undo the laws challenging their pollution
based profits. They argue that pesticides are harmless; that global
warming is a myth; that Mount Pinatubo, not chlorofluorocarbons,
caused the ozone hole; that clear cutting is good forest management;
and that Alaska's caribou love the pipeline (Kennedy 2004: 78).
It seems the administration is willing to play games in order to find means to
their ends, even if that involves deception. In a 2003 memo to his fellow
Republicans, GOP Strategist Frank Luntz said the following:
You need to continue to make the lack of scientific certainty a primary
issue by becoming even more active in recruiting experts sympathetic
to your view (Luntz, as quoted in Kennedy 2004: 77)
This quote speaks to the repeated attempts to produce the desired results and
outcomes that would specifically (and solely) serve the needs of the Bush
administration and its industry cronies. In fact, controversy once again
clouded over the administration when 24 year old George Deutsch, a Bush
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appointee in the NASA public relations department, unexpectedly resigned
(Johnson Jr. 2006). Deutsch, a former employee of Bush's reelection campaign
in 2004, left NASA after it was made public that he had lied about graduating
from Texas A&M with a degree in journalism (Johnson Jr. 2006). The young
appointee had already made headlines for demanding that any scientific
document developed by NASA regarding the "big bang" must be rewritten
to read "big bang theory" (Peterson 2006). Actions, such as the appointment
of Deutsch (with no valid educational degree) and his subsequent behavior of
altering and censoring documents are indicative of the values exhibited by
the Bush administration.
Michael Oppenheimer, Princeton University geo-scientist, has more to
say on the subject:
[a]t the shallowest level it's cheap deception of the general public. At
its worst, this approach represents a serious erosion in the way a
democracy deals with science. You create high-sounding credentials
and talk in tones that seem scientifically sensible, while all the time
you are just fronting for a political agenda (Michael Oppenheimer, as
quoted in Kennedy 2004: 78)
Scientists and politicians alike are recognizing the illusory techniques being
put forth by the Bush administration to confuse and convince the public that
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there is no need for concern over global warming. Ironically enough, these
actions only stimulate the need for more concern.
In 2004, the Union of Concerned Scientists (a nonprofit organization in
support of accurate scientific reporting and policy) released an investigatory
report entitled "Scientific Integrity in Policymaking: An Investigation of the
Bush Administration's Misuse of Science" (Kennedy Jr. 2004). The report,
which unfortunately received minimal publicity, stated the following:
There is strong documentation of a wide-ranging effort to manipulate
the government's scientific advisory system to prevent the appearance
of advice that might run counter to the administration's political
agenda. There is significant evidence that the scope and scale of the
manipulation, suppression, and misrepresentation of science by the
Bush administration is unprecedented (Union of Concerned Scientists,
as quoted in Kennedy Jr. 2004: 95).
Among the 60 distinguished scientists that signed the report were 20 Nobel
laureates (Kennedy Jr. 2004). It seems obvious that if these individuals were
concerned about the actions of the Bush administration, the general public
should also be.
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CHAPTER VI
APPLICATION OF THEORY
Introduction to Findings and Application of Theory
Findings regarding state crime, related theories and the application of
the state crime theoretical model are discussed in this section. The data
discussed here were taken from blue note cards delineating theoretical issues,
namely state crime theory. More specifically, data reported here are from the
state crime category (SC). Because of the categorical makeup (data pertaining
specifically to theoretical issues) all data were recorded on blue note cards,
thus easily grouped for assessment. This category held the highest number of
note cards, with thirty-seven total for review. The findings are as follows.
In the attempt to organize the actions of the Bush administration
regarding the Kyoto Protocol in order to reach a conclusion, a theoretical
model must be applied. Differential association theory, first developed by
Edward Sutherland (1940) has been used for decades to explain on an
individual level the process by which one becomes deviant (Laub and
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Sampson 1991; Michalowski and Kramer 2006). One tier of analysis that
differential association cannot account for is the institutional level.
Table 1: An Integrated Theoretical Model of State-Corporate Crime
TAllLE l. T.

An Integrnied Theoretical Model of State-Corporate Crime
Cat:ilysts for Artion
Levels ofA11"iysis

Motiv;1tio11

Opportunity

Control

Institutional enviromm·nt

Culture nf ,:rnnpetition
EcoJHllllir prcssu1T
Org:1niz:1lio11:1I go,rl.s
l'erform;111te c111ph,1sis

Av,rilability of le�:,\ me:111.1
Obstark.s and rnll.ltr;rint.s
13lorkl'll goals/strain
Availability of illeg:1I me:ins
Acn·ss to rl'S(l'lln:t's

I ntmi1tion:1I re:ict.ion.1
l'olitic:il pressure
Le�;il sa1Ktio11.�
Media scrutiny
l't1blic opinion
Soria\ nwvernc11ts

(lrga-niz:itio,d

Corpor:ite rnlture
Oper,1tiw g,.ds
Subunit go,rls
M:inageri,11 pressme

I 11.1trurnrntal rationality
lntnoal constraints
Defective SOi's
Creation of illeg:il m,·,ms
Role .specialization
T:isk scgr,wtion
Co,nputer, td,·cornn1t111ic:1ti1m,
rnd networking technologies
Normalization of deviance

Culturt· of rn111plia11tT
Subndturc.s of resistance
Codes of condoct
Reward structure
Safety and qu,rlity control
(:011Jlllllllit:atio11 proCL'SSL'S

Socdiz:itron

lldinitions of situacions
l'nrcptiuns of :iv:iibbility and
attractiwness nf illc·gal means

Personal rnorality
IZ;1cio11alizations ;111d techniques of
neutralization
Diffusion of responsibility
Separacion from consequences
Obedience to authority
Groupthi11k

,' .

I 11t,•r;Ktiu11al

S,Ki:11 111e;111i11g

Individual goals
Cumpetitivt' individualism
M:iteri:il succcs.s emphasis

Source:

Extracted from Michalowski, R.J. & Kramer, RC. 2006. "State-Corporate Crime: Wrongdoing at the
Intersection of Business and Government." New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

In this case, there are several separate planes of behavior that need to be
analyzed. Therefore, a model that can accommodate the institutional level of
analysis must be applied.
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The integrated theoretical model developed by Michalowski and
Kramer (2006) is a perfect fit for the data (see Figure 6). The theoretical model
identifies three levels of analysis-Institutional, Organizational and
Interactional (Michalowski and Kramer 2006)-which are used to separate
and classify the actions of different players in a multi-level organization. Each
of these levels is then again broken into an additional three categories for
further analysis: Motivation, Opportunity and Control. These three categories
allow for the breakdown of potential catalysts for deviance. Motivation is
linked to "goal attainment, availability and perceived attractiveness of
illegitimate means, and an absence of effective social control" (Michalowski
and Kramer 2006: 24). Opportunity identifies the likelihood of deviance when
legal means are either scarce or unattractive, and Control identifies social
controls within
_ in a society that may or may not prove to be a successful
deterrent from crime (Michalowski and Kramer 2006). With careful
consideration, the actions taken by the United States government (and
individual actors within the government) can be applied to the model in
order to provide an explanation of state crime. The three levels are broken
down and categorized throughout the rest of the chapter.
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Institutional Environment
The Institutional level is the broadest level of analysis and is also
referred to as the structural level (Taylor, Walton and Young 1973). The
institutional level is significant because it is often overlooked, as many focus
on the individual level, ignoring the pressures that can be imposed on a large,
organizational scale (Michalowski and Kramer 2006). Gross (as quoted in
Michalowski and Kramer 2006) believes that any large organization is
inherently predisposed to criminal behavior, and there seems to be no
exception in this case. For the purposes of this paper, the Institutional level
includes the United States government as a whole, including all three
branches of government. As the original intention of the three branches was
to develop a 'checks and balances' system, no one branch can completely
detach itself from the actions taken by another. The motivations for a state
crime suggested by Michalowski and Kramer (2006) include first and
foremost the culture of competition and economic pressures.
As a capitalist society, the United States is very susceptible to not only
the culture of, but also the pressures of both international and national
competition. This competition on a global scale is perhaps most evident in the
oil industry. It is no secret that the energy industries have ties within the
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government (i.e. Philip Cooney and API, Condoleezza Rice and the Chevron
Tanker). As these industries also have a stronghold on the economy, it is no
surprise that they would play a role in governmental policy actions.
Competitively protecting these economic interests was certainly a motivation
in the dismissal of the Kyoto Protocol as it could be perceived as a threat to
both competitive and economic ascendency. We've seen pressure from the
industries to the administration in the form of campaign contributions ($48.3
million to the Bush campaign from the energy industry, and then another $58
million after his inauguration; $700,000 to Spencer Abraham from the
automotive industry). And we've also seen, on a continual basis, the
censorship, alteration or avoidance of global warming and hence
environmental regulation to the benefit of these industries (as seen, most
evidently, in the failure to sign the Kyoto Protocol).
Several opportunities existed for the government when it came to
environmental protection, most notably, the Kyoto Protocol. While this
would have been a readily available and legal method of action, it was not
ideal for the US. The ratification of the protocol would have held the
government to obligations it did not want to commit to. The chief negotiator
of the protocol on the behalf of the US found the document to be "unsound,"
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even though almost the entire global community was on board with Kyoto
(Dobriansky 2005). Those who denounce the Kyoto Protocol for the US state
their principle interests to be on the behalf of the country, but Coleman (1989)
suggests ulterior motives:
Government agents work behind the scenes and out of the public view,
often times violating the laws they claim to be protecting. This seeming
paradox is a reflection of the fact that while the ruling elites in
contemporary industrial societies have enormous power, it is not
unlimited power (Coleman 1989: 55).
We can see evidence of this in the different additions to the Kyoto Protocol
that the US negotiators pushed for. Emissions trading was a major issue
supported by the United States: it allowed the US to continue with current
rates of pollution as long as enough ERUs could be purchased from other
nations. In this way, the US did not have to make many adjustments at all.
The US pushed emissions trading against the will of other countries
(specifically European countries) and played a major role in securing its place
in the final protocol (Sands 2003). However, the clause was added that ERUs
could not be the sole method used to reach emissions goals, much to the
dismay of the United States (Sands 2003). These legal means offered by the
protocol were no long advantageous to the US.
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The United States continued to search for alternative methods to
reaching emissions goals without actually reducing emissions. Joint
implementation (JI) was another mechanism pushed that would have allowed
the US to create programs that would lower emissions in other Annex B
countries17 and receive credit for it, rather than having to lower emissions
within the US (Sands 2003). This would have been another economicaIIy
savvy option for United States legislators and business owners. Yet again, it
could only be used as an alternative method for lowering emissions, it could
not be used to replace the actual reductions of emissions. United States
negotiators then moved on to the inclusion of carbon sinks in the protocol,
which are natural removers of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere (such as
the oceans and forests). US negotiators hoped that by planting and protecting
plant life, they could reach their emissions goals through an alternative
method rather than having to scale down corporate pollution. Both JI and
carbon sinks were widely supported by the US, and discouraged by European
countries. While the United States wanted to do everything to lower

Annex B countries originally included the US, Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland, Croatia, New Zealand, Norway,
Australia, Iceland, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Monaco, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Switzerland in the first draft of the Protocol. The idea of Annex B countries is to reach 1990
levels of emissions by 2012 by redistributing "their targets among themselves, taking advantage of a scheme under
the Protocol known as a "bubble" whereby countries have different individual targets, but which combined make
an overall target for that group of countries (UNFCCCa 2008).
17
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emissions except actually reduce US emissions, other countries were in
support of only using these alternative methods as supplementary (if they
supported them at all). These actions demonstrate the attempts made by the
US to mold the protocol into a non-restrictive contract that bore little
regulation. When these goals could not be achieved, the US simply backed
out of the agreement, and refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol-even after
these adjustments had been made to accommodate them and meet their
demands.
In actuality, the legal means (i.e. the Kyoto Protocol) that were
available were not conducive to the culture of competition, and the failure of
the US government to comply with these regulations would have led to legal
sanctions from the global community. Thus, these legal sanctions were
obstacles and constraints on the goals of the US government. Also, the
sanctions would have produced obstacles and constraints for the energy
industries, which likely would not have made the contributing industrialists
happy. By not signing the protocol, the government found alternative means
that carried with them no constraints. Alternative means, such as the
reductions in carbon intensity emissions, as opposed to absolute emissions
reductions (as discussed in chapter five). Actions such as these give the
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illusion that the government is taking great environmental action, and
protecting environmental laws, when it is actually doing the opposite.
The ability of the government to control this specific scenario was
almost effortless. While there was political pressure· from both sides, the
decision of the Senate in 1998 against the protocol (95- 0) was a huge
persuasion against signing. Although its government was in agreement, the
decision of the US to not ratify the protocol certainly sparked an international
uproar. However, the global community was all but powerless to do anything
about it. As discussed throughout, it was expected that the US would be a
leader in the fight to protect the environment, and the actions to the contrary
were surprising. But the fact that the government had not ratified the
document held them to no obligations, and thus no legal sanctions. Aside
from a 'wagging of a finger' from international media, the US faced few
repercussions. What is even more startling is the lack of coverage by the
media of the issue when it occurred. Most media exposure regarding the
Kyoto Protocol came well after the fact, thus suggesting that a majority of US
citizens were uniformed or oblivious. On top of this, the government was at
this point in time downplaying the severity of global warming (BBC 2007; Bee
2007; Eilperin 2005; Gore 2006; MSNBC 2001; Piltz 2005; Rewriting the Science
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2006; Kennedy Jr. 2004; and Sands 2005), which may also have contributed to
the lack of outcry from the American public. All things considered, the US
government was very much in control of the circumstances surrounding the
Kyoto Protocol.
Organizational
The organizational level is perhaps the most offensive in this particular
case, although it is certainly difficult to measure harm that is yet to be
realized. The Bush administration plays the organizational role in this fiasco
in that a majority of the administration is made up of players strategically
appointed by Bush (refer back to chapter five). The Bush administration
engaged in corporate culture in strategic hiring as well as the thinning out of
government programs and funding, as demonstrated by the cutting of funds
to various environmental agencies (namely NASA and the EPA). In the same
way, operative goals can be said to be found in the neo-conservative actions
that have recently been taking place through the newly enforced internal
regulation, as experienced by both EPA and NASA employees, among others
(Eilperin 2005; Kennedy Jr. 2004; MSNBC 2007; PBS Frontline 2006; Piltz 2005;
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Revkin 2006 and Rewriting the Science 2006). Political pressure is
experienced by the administration from both sides-from the public
(to act on environmental policy) and from the businesses that have
successfully lobbied the administration (to restrict environmental policy)-to
uphold their end of the respective bargains.
As for opportunity, the Bush administration has created its own. Any
internal constraints that may have existed were removed during the
weakening of governmental programs and the strategic placement of fellow
cronies in positions of power. As for defective standard operating procedures
(SOPs), these were most evident in organizations such as the EPA, which lost
efficiency as it lost funding (Kennedy Jr. 2004). To reiterate, the EPA lost over
$31 million in budget cuts specifically dealing with pollution programs in
Bush's most recent budget, as well as over $285 million in other
environmental programs (Environmental News Service 2008). NASA is also
an example, as SOPs were modified in order to fit the needs of the
administration. This is evident from the altered release procedures for
scientific data as discussed by Piltz and Hansen (Rewriting the Science 2006).
Last, because of the cutting of programs and the appointing of unqualified
candidates to government positions, there was lack of role specialization and
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task segregation. Simply put, no one really knew who was responsible for
what; therefore it was much more difficult to hold any individual or
organization responsible. The scrambling of responsibilities allowed
continued ignorance to the issue, as well as continued ignorance towards
environmental regulation. Thus, lax regulation (or increased regulation, in the
case of NASA scientists) created illegal means in which the government could
operate. There were no restrictions from an international agreement, there
was little leaking to the press about the severity of the situation, and there
was confusion within the regulatory committees as to who needed to take
what action. In this way, the Bush administration set the stage for the
normalization of deviance. This is the manner in which the administration
entered the presidency, and it appears that it will also be the way in which it
will leave.
When addressing the issue of control, the subculture of resistance is
exhibited by the Bush administration. Essentially, the administration resisted
the preexisting conditions left by the Clinton administration, and thus reset
the stage to comply with their needs; needs, which can only be described as
self serving. This prohibited the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, which
would have been detrimental to the energy industries and subsequently
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detrimental to those of the administration who had vested interests in these
industries. Therefore, the administration constructed its own rewards
through their illegal means and/or methods, in which they failed to place
effective environmental regulations in the United States. Regulations that
were put in place (such as carbon intensity targets discussed in chapter five)
were less than effective.
Safety and quality control was eliminated by the administration during
the elimination of the differential environmental organization positions, and
the restructuring of the functioning of the organizations (Kennedy Jr. 2004;
Rewriting the Science 2006) leaving the administration in complete control.
This is witnessed most specifically in the changes made to processes of
scientific information released to the public, as well as the censorship and
alteration of documents by Philip Cooney. Furthermore, communication
regarding the impending environmental crisis was thus limited not only
within the different organizations (i.e. restricting what NASA scientists could
say) but was also limited to the media, and thus the general public. Clearly,
the administration had taken control of the environmental and scientific
agencies and thus limited their power.
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Interactional
The interactional level narrows the scope to focus solely on President
George W. Bush. As an individual actor, Bush made the decision almost
immediately after entering the White House not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
Perhaps the most important motivation for the President's actions was his
own socialization. Prior to entering the White House, Bush was very involved
in the oil industry in Texas (Kennedy Jr. 2004) and he did not cut ties when he
took up his new position. Maintaining all of these social and economic
connections, it is no surprise that the president would also be expected to
protect the interests of those who had helped him to obtain that position.
Environmental policies such as the Kyoto Protocol would be very detrimental
to the process and profits of the oil industry. This specific socialization can be
said to be a motivation which led Bush away from a Kyoto commitment.
Individual goals would also tie directly into the socialization process. The
success of the oil companies would then lead to profits for those who laid
stake in said companies. By keeping his social connections close, Bush was
keeping his profits closer.
We see evidence in this directly through the decision not to ratify
Kyoto. Rather than sign on to a global commitment, Bush made his own
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'commitments' through such programs as the reduction in intensity targets,
as discussed earlier. Actions such as these held Bush to very little-if any at
all-regulation of the energy industry. We also see evidence of this in Bush's
continued assertion that global warming is not directly caused by human
activity. The international community agrees that it is, but Bush, apparently,
is still on the fence at best. In order to backup his claims, Bush manipulated
the science sector of the government. Through strategic appointments
(Cooney, Deutsch etc.), and the silencing of others (Hansen, Piltz etc.) he was
able to keep his viewpoints in the reports, and valid science out.
As for opportunity, there was plenty available, and Bush became more
aware of the availability of illegal means. By eliminating the obligations
imposed by the Kyoto Protocol, Bush was allowed to implement his own
environmental policies which left him and his associates often free of
regulation (this is evident in the continued research on global warming and
lack of regulatory restrictions set in place by the Bush administration-it
seems as though the president is just stalling until his term is up). The
president now had the power and the opportunity to mold environmental
policies and programs to fit his specific needs, as opposed to the needs of the
environment itself. Bush was also able to redefine the situation, and focus
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more on what he deemed as important. Rather than protecting the
environment, Bush protected his assets. The spin from the Bush
administration that was projected in the media was that environmental
protection was and is a threat to the national economy, as opposed to the
imperative issue that it is (Sands 2005). This new face discouraged many from
fighting for the environment, and instead redirected their focus to protecting
their pocketbooks.
After all of the actions taken at the institutional and organizational
levels, Bush was able to control the situation fairly easily. Diffusion of
responsibility, as discussed earlier, led to confusion and no place to lay blame.
Because of the restructuring (of procedures and censorship) that occurred
within government environmental agencies, there was a separation from the
consequences so much so that many were hesitant to accuse Bush of
inappropriate action (or inaction). When it was deemed necessary to begin
censoring scientific data pertaining to global warming, Bush exercised his
authority and those involved were obedient to him. Anyone who challenged
his authority, or disagreed with the censorship, was either fired, or, in the
instance of Rick Piltz, left the organization on his or her own (Rewriting the
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Science 2006). All of these actions were contributing or consequential factors
of the decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
On all three levels (Institutional, Organization and Interactional) there
has been both motivation and opportunity for criminal behavior. The
catalysts identified by Michalowski and Kramer (2006) were indeed indicative
of state crime. And, as seen here, social controls were not strong enough to
discourage the participants from deviant activity. Therefore, the actions of the
US government regarding the Kyoto Protocol can be said to be a state crime,
as defined by the model.
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CHAPTER VII
CLOSING REMARKS
The Protocol
The purpose of this research has been to demonstrate how the failure
of the US to ratify the Kyoto Protocol could productively be seen as a state
crime. The Kyoto Protocol, perhaps one of the most pivotal environmental
agreements ever enacted, was seen as "not workable" for the United States
(Dobriansky 2005). Even though special care had been taken to accommodate
the demands of the US (emissions trading, the inclusion of sinks etc.), the
administration failed to climb aboard. Although all other major opponents of
the protocol (Malaysia, Brazil and Saudi Arabia) eventually ended up signing
the document, the United States made no attempt to do so, even though
participation in the protocol at any level was seen as beneficial globally. The
protocol, which was designed to be broad in order to lighten the economic
burden for everyone, was losing one of the top emitters of greenhouse gases.
Instead, the US joined Kazakhstan as one of only two nations who signed, but
did not ratify the protocol.
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The justifications from the Bush administration for not ratifying the
protocol were largely based on the economy, as they thought they could
lower emissions on their own without the economic burden imposed by the
Kyoto Protocol. In spite of this, little action to preserve the state of the
economy or the environment has been witnessed over the past eight years. In
their attempts to maintain their ties and financing from the energy industry,
the Bush administration participated in many harmful activities regarding
both environmental protection and regulation. Their failure to enforce, or
even establish environmental regulation, in light of the scientific evidence, is
apparent throughout the presidency. The attempts to both alter and withhold
this scientific evidence is perhaps even more upsetting. But what can not be
excused is the blatant act to go against international compromise and
commitment in order to serve their own vested interests by both failing to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and then failing to maintain current environmental
regulation already imposed in the US.
Perhaps these actions stem from the fact that President Bush, ignoring
an entire united world of scientists, does not himself believe in global
warming. Perhaps it should have been evident when during his first term,
President Bush halted environmental regulation, and proposed budget cuts
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for environmental agencies (over $316 million altogether) and appointed
individuals (i.e. Cooney and Deutsch) - with no environmental background
- to environmental positions. And perhaps it should have been evident from
the start when environmental groups declared the Bush administration
"hopeless" (Kluger 2006: 7). At any rate, the actions taken by the
administration break the trend set prior by US environmental action. For
decades, the United States had been a leader in environmental protection,
supporting (if not ratifying) every convention and protocol put forth by the
global community, and even entering into a Quality Air agreement with
Canada. During the last eight years, however, the Bush administration has
pushed the need for further environmental research to cover up their lack of
action, and declared the Kyoto Protocol to be "not sound policy" even though
the rest of the world agreed that it was (Dobriansky 2005).
Motivations Behind the Actions
A second focus of this study has been to identify both political and
economic motivations for these actions by governmental actors through
documents and press releases. The findings here most definitely suggest
intranational political and economic motivation. Perhaps the first method to
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sway public attention from the severity of global warming was the word
alteration to "climate change." This seemingly innocent tactic is a persuasive
and unassuming method of manipulation. Perhaps the general public should
have expected actions such as these after the first wave of broken
environmental promises by the president, as Bush did indeed lead the
American people to believe that he was on board with the Kyoto Protocol.
Instead, Bush and his administration were more concerned with supporting
economic gro-wth, as opposed to environmental stability.
Financial persuasion from the American Petroleum Institute (API) may
have been hard for the president to ignore. Considering he appointed a
former lobbyist from the API (Philip Cooney) to an important environmental
position, and allowed propaganda for the API to appear in a status report
from the EPA, it is easy to see how he could lose sight of environmental goals.
This politicization has single-handedly undermined the scientific program,
and as Oppenhiemer asserted, is indeed deception of the public for a political
agenda.
This mismanagement of scientific information was not without
purpose for the Bush administration. Through distortion and omission, the
administration molded the data when it was beneficial to their industrial
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allies. This can be seen through Bush's praising of alternative fuel sources
while at the same time encouraging America's oil addiction. Granted,
environmental regulations have a tendency to be costly at first. The Kyoto
Protocol would have indeed required economic adjustments. But the end
result, as with any environmental action, would have borne much fruit. The
Bush administration, however, could not see that far into the future. Because
ratifying the protocol held no economic benefit for them (at least not within
their term of office), they had no interest in pursuing the matter. Unwilling to
compromise with other developing countries, and the global community, the
United States let down more than just its citizens; it let down the entire
planet.
President Bush asserted that the development of a country is not a
right, but instead a goal of every nation (Sands 2003). Well, I disagree, and I
call that, breaking protocol.
Limitations
This study, while complete for its own purposes, is vastly incomplete
in its scope. New data pertaining to the environmental actions of the Bush
administration are being released on a daily basis, as well as information
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regarding global warming. Every effort was made to include a variety of
examples of the actions taken by the Bush administration against the
environment. I would like to conclude by pointing out that this study reveals
only the tip of the iceberg, perhaps the only iceberg that is growing (rather
than shrinking) in size.
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